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In the summer of 1951, after a year of war in which neither side proved capable of achieving military victory, the USled United Nations Command (UNC) and the Chinese-North Korean coalition began truce talks in an attempt to end
the fighting through negotiations. These talks provide a significant example of limited war conflict termination,
illustrating the interplay of force and diplomacy and the role of third parties and coalition partners in negotiations.
The two sides turned to negotiations only after failing to reunify Korea through military force. The initial North
Korean offensive was stopped by United Nations Command intervention. The UNC itself came close to military
success with a counterattack into the North in October 1950. The Chinese then sent an army into Korea, forcing the
UNC to withdraw from the North. This force pushed deep into South Korea before being repulsed by a United Nations
Command counteroffensive. The UNC was briefly checked by new Chinese and North Korean offensives in April and
May 1951, but by mid-June its forces had advanced generally north of the 38th Parallel, the pre-war boundary between
North and South Korea.
In May 1951, after a major strategy review, the US leadership, concluding that any further advances would require the
introduction of substantial additional forces, decided to pursue truce negotiations.[1] The rising cost of the war, the
success of the UNC counteroffensive, and the failure of their own spring offensives also led the Chinese and North
Korean leadership, with Soviet agreement, to seek a negotiated end to the war with the objective of restoring the prewar boundary.[2]
Some have since argued that a continued offensive might have led to an armistice more favorable to the United States
and South Korea, but the costs would have mounted had the UNC pressed north into the mountains against
increasingly well-entrenched Chinese and North Korean forces with shorter lines of communication. Furthermore, it is
not at all clear that the Chinese would have been willing to agree to truce negotiations if the UNC had advanced deep
into North Korea. Negotiations to restore the status quo were clearly acceptable to the Chinese, but faced with the loss
of substantial North Korean territory, they may well have been motivated to pour additional men and resources into
Korea, accepting even greater sacrifices to avoid defeat.[3]
The nations providing combat troops to the UNC were quite willing to see the war end. Although Republic of Korea
(ROK) President Syngman Rhee (Yi Sung-man) opposed any settlement that would leave Korea divided and the
Communists in control of the North, the ROK forces could not fight on alone and so he reluctantly acquiesced to the
initiation of truce talks. Throughout the subsequent talks, the United States would control the UNC negotiations, but
both the major UN allies and the Republic of Korea would exert pressure and sometimes influence policy, the allies
pushing for compromise and Rhee's government pressing for tougher UNC positions.[4]

Figure 1. Korea.

After preliminary discussions between US and Soviet officials, the Soviet deputy foreign minister suggested in a 23
June 1951 radio speech that the two sides seek a cease-fire.[5] On 30 June General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander
in Chief of the United Nations Command (CINCUNC), proposed that truce talks begin aboard a Danish hospital ship
moored in Wonsan Harbor. Kim Il-sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA), and Peng Dehuai,
Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV), counter-proposed that the talks take place in Kaesong, the old
Korean capital. Kaesong was then located between the lines and unoccupied by either side. The US leadership,
anticipating that the talks would bring a speedy end to the war and seeing no disadvantage in the proposed location,
accepted. By the time the talks began, however, KPA/CPV forces had moved into the town, giving them control of the
conference site. And as the talks dragged on, subsequent UNC commanders found their operations hindered by having
the conference site astride the main military avenue of approach between the two Koreas.[6]
Each side was represented at the truce talks by a military negotiating team of five principal delegates assisted by staff
officers who worked out the details of agreements and maintained contact during the long recesses. The Chinese and
North Korean negotiators operated from a location near Kaesong while the UNC team maintained a base camp at
Munsan, about 15 miles southeast of the conference site.
The senior KPA/CPV delegate was the KPA chief of staff and North Korean vice-foreign minister, Lieutenant General
Nam Il, who was assisted at the negotiating table by two North Korean and two Chinese generals or admirals. The
UNC negotiators soon concluded that although General Nam publicly represented the Chinese and North Korean side,

it was the Chinese who were actually in charge. Subsequent evidence from Chinese and Russian sources supports the
notion that the Chinese government established policy for the KPA/CPV delegation, coordinating the most important
decisions with North Korean and Soviet leaders. Beijing transmitted its instructions through a team headed by Li
Kenong, Chinese vice-foreign minister and deputy chief of staff of the Chinese army, who directed negotiations from
behind the scenes.[7
The Chinese strategic goals were to increase China's influence and reshape the international order in East Asia. They
sought an end to US support for the Nationalist regime on Taiwan and the seating of the People's Republic of China in
the United Nations. The Chinese aims with regard to Taiwan and the United Nations were set forth in a 17 January
1951 communication to the UN. When they decided to negotiate, the Chinese dropped these demands as preconditions
for engaging in truce talks, but did not abandon them as long-range goals. Their immediate truce objectives thus
focused on restoration of the status quo ante with a truce line at the 38th Parallel. A final settlement of the Korean
question was to come at a postwar international conference.[8]
On the UNC side, the US government took sole responsibility for the negotiations. Abraham Feller, legal advisor to
UN Secretary General Trygve Lie, concluded that the provisions of the UN Security Council resolutions under which
the UNC was established entitled the United States to conduct the negotiations.[9] The Americans isolated the military
negotiators from direct influence by the UN allies by insisting that all intergovernment negotiations take place in
Washington. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk justified this by arguing, "It would be too
great a burden for Ridgway to conduct such negotiations in Tokyo in addition to all his other pressing duties."[10]
The Americans also wanted to ensure that the talks remained limited to military matters. General Ridgway had wanted
to keep his political advisor, William J. Sebald, and US Ambassador to Korea John J. Muccio at the UNC base camp
at Munsan to provide political guidance to the negotiating team. But fearing that the presence of these diplomats might
indicate that the UNC would be willing to address nonmilitary matters, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting on the advice
of the US State Department, rejected the idea.[11]
The US leadership transmitted its guidance to the UNC delegation in Korea through directives sent by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the Tokyo-based UNC Commander-in-Chief. The UNC chief negotiator was Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy,
Commander of US Naval Forces Far East, who served until May 1952, when he was replaced by Lieutenant General
William K. Harrison. In addition to the senior delegate, the UNC was represented by three American generals or
admirals and one Republic of Korea army general.[12]
US long-range national security objectives in Asia were to reduce or eliminate Soviet influence and establish
cooperative relationships among friendly, noncommunist governments. The US leadership hoped this would diminish
any threat to the United States from Asia and assure US access to the resources of the region. In support of those
goals, the United States sought a "united, independent and democratic Korea," but that objective was to be achieved by
"political, as distinguished from military, means."[13] Overall US objectives for Korea were to terminate hostilities
under "appropriate armistice arrangements," provide for the eventual withdrawal of non-Korean armed forces, and
assure that the Republic of Korea border was drawn no farther south than the 38th Parallel while permitting the ROK to
build sufficient forces to deter or repel renewed North Korean aggression.[14]
The United States also had very specific objectives for the Armistice Agreement: that it be confined to military matters
in Korea; that it require the cessation of all acts of armed force; that it be supervised by a Military Armistice
Commission with powers of observation and inspection; and that the number and types of military personnel and
equipment in Korea not be qualitatively or quantitatively increased.[15] The US leadership initially desired prisoners
of war (POW) be exchanged on a one-for-one basis, but this position changed once negotiations began.[16]
The Talks Begin: Atmospherics, Agenda, and Substance
While both sides sought an armistice, neither trusted the intentions of the other. Both believed that any concession
would be taken as a sign of weakness, and each side was convinced that military pressure was essential to force the
other side to compromise. Ideological differences, cultural misperceptions, and the bitter nature of the war intensified
the mutual suspicion and hostility that marked the talks. During the first meeting, both sides acted in a businesslike
manner, but the underlying antagonism was evident. The UNC delegates refused food and other amenities offered by

the KPA/CPV, while the Chinese and North Koreans took advantage of their control of Kaesong to portray themselves
as victorious hosts. They also restricted access to the conference site, denying entry to journalists accompanying the
UNC negotiators. After several days of sparring on this issue, the KPA/CPV agreed on 15 July 1951 to establish a
Kaesong Neutral Zone to which both sides would have equal access.[17]
During the next two weeks the negotiators worked out an agenda and began substantive talks.[18] The first issue was
the location and nature of the truce line and demilitarized zone. The KPA/CPV side insisted on a truce line along the
38th Parallel. The UNC, whose forces had pushed north of the parallel except for an area near Kaesong, sought a line
well north of the existing line of ground contact, arguing that UNC air and naval power should be factored into the
location of the truce line. The 38th Parallel was significant to both sides. KPA/CPV ejection of the UNC from North
Korea and restoration of the status quo could be portrayed as a victory by them, while if the UNC achieved a truce line
north of the 38th Parallel it would have more than met its initial objectives. ROK President Rhee, to whom the 38th
Parallel was a hated symbol of Korea's division, also demanded that the UNC not accept a truce along that line. In spite
of these differences, the two sides had by 22 August come close to agreement on a Military Demarcation Line (MDL)
based on the ground contact line. But at that point the KPA/CPV unilaterally declared a recess.
Although they charged that UNC air attacks had made the conference site unsafe, their actual motivation for the recess
seems to have been to gain time while they reassessed their strategy and considered a possible new offensive.[19]
During the long recess, the UNC, which had been dissatisfied with the Kaesong site from the beginning, sought to
relocate the talks to a more neutral location. The KPA/CPV, after completing their strategy review and deciding
against a major offensive, concurred, and on 22 October the two sides agreed to relocate the talks to a new site at
Panmunjom, several miles to the east.[20]
When negotiations resumed on 25 October both sides had accepted the principle of an MDL based on the line of
ground contact, but the location of the line and the timing of when it would go into effect were still disputed.
KPA/CPV forces had remained on the defensive during the Kaesong phase of the truce talks, but the UNC continued
its air and naval attacks and conducted limited ground offensives that by 23 October had pushed the line of contact
north by about ten miles. Ridgway believed that these attacks had brought the other side back to the negotiating table,
and there is some evidence that he was correct.[21] Concerned the negotiations might drag on and fearing that
immediate agreement on the truce line would make further offensives impossible, Ridgway insisted that the truce line
should be based on the line of ground contact at the time the armistice was signed. The UNC also proposed adjusting
the current line of contact, giving up ground near the east coast in return for placing Kaesong in the UNC zone. The
KPA/CPV insisted on immediate agreement on the location of the MDL and refused to give up Kaesong.
Ridgway's efforts to regain Kaesong were prompted by recognition of the military importance of the area as the main
avenue of approach into the south and by strong pressures from Syngman Rhee, to whom the old Korean capital had
symbolic significance. Neither of these arguments was persuasive to the US leadership, which faced important
diplomatic battles in the fall UN General Assembly session and was in the final stages of negotiating a multinational
peace treaty with Japan. US leaders believed the armistice would soon go into effect and did not want to be seen as
delaying agreement over what might be viewed as trivial issues. Bowing to orders and under strong protest, Ridgway
on 13 November directed his negotiators to propose a four-kilometer- wide Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) centered on an
MDL running along the current battle line if all other issues were settled within 30 days. With this concession,
specifics were soon worked out and on 27 November 1951 the two sides agreed to an MDL running approximately
along the line of ground contact. Although subsequent fighting required some minor adjustments, the line remained
substantially unchanged until the Armistice was signed.[22]
The two sides then addressed concrete measures to implement the Armistice. They quickly agreed on a Military
Armistice Commission with equal representation from both sides, but differed as to the nature and scope of its
activities. The UNC wanted a supervisory mechanism with the power of inspection throughout Korea and, fearing a
challenge to UNC air superiority, also called for a ban on the repair or construction of airfields. The KPA/CPV
accepted the idea of supervision inside the DMZ but rejected the airfield repair ban and inspections outside the
DMZ.[23]
On 3 December 1951 the KPA/CPV proposed a compromise, suggesting Armistice supervision outside the

Demilitarized Zone by nations "neutral in the Korean War." The UNC accepted and by March 1952 the two sides had
agreed to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland as members of a Neutral Nations Supervisory
Commission (NNSC) as well as on procedures for the rotation of military personnel and equipment. This resolved the
Armistice implementation issue except for airfield repair and a new KPA/CPV demand that the Soviet Union be
included in the neutral commission.[24] Resolution of these matters soon became embroiled in the far more difficult
issue of repatriation of prisoners of war.
The Prisoner of War Obstacle
Both sides had initially assumed that all POWs would be exchanged at the conclusion of an armistice. However,
among the prisoners held by the UNC were many former residents of South Korea who had been inducted into the
KPA and subsequently captured. The United States agreed with the South Korean government that they should be
allowed to return to their homes in the south. Many of the Chinese soldiers in the CPV had originally been in the
Nationalist Chinese army, and some of these were likely to prefer to go to Taiwan rather than being forced to return to
Communist China.
By the time negotiations began on the POW issue, US President Harry Truman had become convinced that prisoners
should not be repatriated against their will. He was heavily influenced in this by memories of the tragic post-World
War II fate of millions of Soviet prisoners who had been forcibly repatriated, many subsequently suffering long
imprisonment or death. General Ridgway argued against this policy, fearing it would delay an armistice and jeopardize
UNC prisoners held by the KPA/CPV. Nonetheless, Truman held firm to his convictions. His concern was
humanitarian, but other US officials also foresaw a moral and propaganda victory if large numbers of Chinese and
North Korean soldiers rejected communism.[25] In January 1952, when the UNC proposed voluntary repatriation of
prisoners of war, the KPA/CPV immediately rejected the concept. While all the other POW-related issues were quickly
resolved, voluntary repatriation became a seemingly in- surmountable obstacle.[26]
Negotiations on both armistice implementation and the POW issue were now stalled, but the two sides managed to
agree on a set of "Recommendations to the Governments Concerned." On 6 February 1952, General Nam Il proposed a
post-Armistice political conference to discuss withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea, specific recommendations for
peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and other problems relating to peace in Korea. The two sides agreed to
these provisions, with a few minor changes, after less than two weeks of discussion.[27]
In March 1952 the KPA/CPV side began to show some flexibility on POWs; if the majority of Chinese and North
Korean prisoners had been willing to return, the KPA/CPV negotiators might have accepted some voluntary
repatriation formula. But on 19 April, after a controversial and sometimes violent process of screening prisoners to
determine their repatriation desires, the UNC advised that out of over 170,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners,
only 70,000 desired repatriation. The KPA/CPV negotiators stated flatly that such a low figure could not possibly be
the basis for further discussion. In an attempt to recast the issues and thus find some common ground, the UNC
negotiators presented what they referred to as a "package proposal" on 28 April. Dropping the ban on airfield repair,
they asked the KPA/CPV to concede on USSR participation in the NNSC and voluntary repatriation. The KPA/CPV
accepted the first two proposals, effectively resolving the Armistice implementation issue, but firmly rejected voluntary
repatriation except for former residents of South Korea who had been impressed into the North Korean army.[28]
With neither side prepared to compromise on this issue, the tone at Panmunjom became increasingly hostile. The
Chinese and North Koreans began an intense propaganda offensive, accusing the United States of conducting germ
warfare. At the same time, bloody uprisings in the UNC-controlled POW camps embarrassed the UNC and cast doubt
on its administration of the camps and the legitimacy and impartiality of the screening. On 8 October 1952, with no
progress in sight, the UNC unilaterally declared a recess.[29] Neither side was prepared to initiate a major offensive,
but both now increased their military activity to put pressure on their opponents.
The UNC resumed limited-objective ground attacks, and General Mark W. Clark, who had replaced Ridgway as
CINCUNC in May, gained approval to conduct the largest air attacks of the war against the North Korean capital of
Pyongyang and to destroy hydroelectric dams on the Yalu River.[30] The Chinese leadership, now convinced that the
war would continue for some time, concluded that the best way to sustain a protracted war was to remain on the overall

defensive, build up their forces, improve their positional defenses, and conduct violent but limited attacks at the
tactical level. The Chinese also began rotating units to give them combat experience and substantially reinforced the
CPV. By early 1953, Chinese troop strength in Korea reached 1.53 million, the highest of the war.[31]
The UNC ground attacks were not sufficiently damaging to persuade the Chinese to compromise. The UNC air attacks
caused great devastation but failed to disrupt the Communist lines of communication and, since the greatest impact was
on North Korean civilians, the attacks had no effect on the will of the Chinese leadership. None of the Chinese ground
attacks were threatening or costly enough to cause the United States to back away from voluntary repatriation. But
their troop reinforcement, strengthening of fortifications, and hardening of their logistical system greatly increased the
costs and diminished the likelihood of success of any future UNC ground offensive.[32] Thus, although the level of
violence in Korea increased substantially in 1952, with neither side prepared to bear the costs of a major ground
offensive, these actions had no discernible effect on the negotiations.
Breaking the Stalemate
With the talks deadlocked, other parties now began to search for a formula that would lead to a truce. During the
Autumn 1952 UN General Assembly session, the Indian delegation, strongly supported by the British and other
Commonwealth countries, suggested the establishment of a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) to deal
with the prisoners refusing repatriation. The United States, under pressure from its allies, agreed to support the Indian
proposal, which was endorsed by the General Assembly on 3 December. The Indian resolution would eventually
provide the basis for solving the POW repatriation issue.[33]
The political equation also began to change on both sides. In January 1953 Dwight Eisenhower came to office
committed to ending the war. The new President was keenly aware that neither the American people nor the UN allies
were likely to accept major new sacrifices and rejected the idea of an offensive to reunify Korea. He was willing to
accept the Armistice as negotiated so far, so long as there was no major compromise on the voluntary repatriation
issue. At the same time, however, he was willing to consider stepped up military measures, including the use of
nuclear weapons against China, if there was no progress in the truce talks.[34] North Korea, by now economically
devastated, was willing to see the war end. The Chinese leadership, their nation strained by the war effort and eager to
begin economic reconstruction, was prepared to return to the truce talks but preferred that the United States make the
first move.[35]
That move came on 22 February 1953 when Clark, following up a Red Cross proposal, called for an exchange of sick
and wounded prisoners. Soon thereafter, on 5 March, Soviet Leader Joseph Stalin died. His successors, facing unrest in
the European satellites and seeking a relaxation of Cold War tensions, were predisposed to a settlement in Korea and
encouraged the Chinese and North Koreans to conclude an armistice.[36] On 28 March the KPA/CPV accepted Clark's
proposal. Two days later Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made a speech in which he proposed that those prisoners not
desiring repatriation be transferred to a neutral state. Kim Il-sung publicly endorsed this policy the next day, as did the
Soviet foreign minister on 1 April.[37]
The Chinese and North Koreans had now accepted the principle of voluntary repatriation, and events began to move
quickly. The exchange of sick and wounded prisoners began on 20 April, and the truce talks resumed on 26 April. On
that date the KPA/CPV put the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission concept on the table, suggesting the NNRC
be composed of the same members as the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, plus India.[38] The two sides
were now close to agreement, but the UNC still found some aspects of the KPA/CPV proposal unacceptable, and
introduced two new demands: that the NNRC work on the basis of consensus, rather than majority vote, and that South
Korean non-repatriates not be turned over to the NNRC. Both positions were contrary to the Indian UN resolution,
which the US government had previously supported, and so, in spite of vociferous South Korean objections, the
Eisenhower Administration ultimately decided not to jeopardize the Armistice over these issues.[39]
On 25 May the UNC presented what it called its final position. Dropping both of the new conditions, it called for the
repatriation of all prisoners within 60 days after the signing of the Armistice. Those refusing repatriation were to be
transferred to the NNRC for a 90-day period during which representatives of their home country would have access to
them under NNRC supervision. After 90 days the postwar political conference would deal with any remaining

nonrepatriates, but after an additional 30 days the nonrepatriates would either be released or their fate decided by the
United Nations General Assembly.[40]
The UNC concessions made the proposal palatable to the Chinese and North Koreans, who were under some pressure
to accept. Not only was the Soviet leadership urging them to bring the war to an end, but the United States had begun
exhibiting a willingness to step up its military action. In May 1953 US aircraft attacked irrigation dams near
Pyongyang, flooding and disrupting rail and road lines. Although the North Koreans were eventually able to neutralize
the effects of further attacks by draining the reservoirs, these raids further strained the North Korean infrastructure.[41]
On 20 May President Eisenhower and his advisors had decided that if the KPA/CPV rejected the final offer, the UNC
would initiate a military offensive that might include attacks on China and the use of nuclear weapons.[42] To signal
this resolve, General Clark publicly warned that if the Chinese and North Koreans did not accept the 25 May proposal,
the UNC would widen its war effort. US officials also attempted to transmit veiled nuclear threats through India and
other countries.[43]
It is unclear what combination of UNC concessions, Soviet pressure, stepped-up air attacks, and nuclear threats
persuaded the Chinese and North Koreans to accept the UNC position, but in combination, they achieved the desired
effect. On 4 June General Nam Il declared, "We basically agree to the new proposal which your side put forward on 25
May."[44] On 8 June the two sides concluded an agreement on voluntary repatriation, and staff officers began a review
of the Armistice language preparatory to its signature.[45]
Feeling betrayed by the 25 May UNC concessions, ROK President Syngman Rhee now made a final effort to derail the
Armistice. He made strong overtures to President Eisenhower, ordered public demonstrations, threatened to remove the
ROK military forces from the UNC, said he would attack any Indian troops that set foot on South Korean soil, and on
17 June unilaterally released Korean prisoners from the UNC POW camps. Rhee's actions brought the negotiations to a
halt. The Chinese and North Koreans refused to accept an armistice without assurance that the South Koreans would
comply with its terms. Rhee finally agreed to abide by the Armistice only after receiving a promise of future US
support, a mutual security treaty with the United States, and a major aid package--and after a series of heavy Chinese
attacks aimed specifically at South Korean units nearly destroyed two ROK divisions.[46] Rhee's acceptance removed
the final obstacle to a truce.
General Nam Il and General Harrison signed the Armistice Agreement at 10 o'clock in the morning of 27 July 1953 in
a hastily constructed pavilion at Panmunjom. Kim Il Sung, Peng Dehuai, and Mark Clark later countersigned the
document in separate ceremonies at Kaesong and Munsan. At 10 o'clock that night the Armistice went into effect and
the guns fell silent across Korea.
Conclusion
Although no future war will ever repeat the combination of circumstances involved in the Korean War truce talks, the
talks are still worth examination by those who may be involved in future limited war conflict termination. The nature
and outcome of the talks were affected by the interplay of many factors. American negotiating policy and strategy
were shaped by US interests, objectives, and activities elsewhere in the world, especially the confrontation with the
Soviet Union and preoccupation with the post-World War II reconstruction of Europe and Japan. Domestic politics,
although played out in very different ways in the United States and China, also affected the leadership of both
countries. Cultural differences and preconceptions colored the attitudes and decisionmaking of both sides, influencing
the character and pace of the talks.
Lack of diplomatic contact or other reliable means of private communication between the United States and China
made the negotiations particularly cumbersome. This effect was made worse by the physical isolation and austere
nature of the conference site, which deprived the delegates of any opportunities for the kinds of informal contacts that
might have facilitated dialogue. The key factors, however, were the intensity of the national interests engaged on each
side, the value each country's leadership placed on its objectives, and the price they were willing to pay to achieve
those objectives.
During the early months of the talks, with the battle lines still somewhat fluid, the UNC was able to use limited ground
attacks to enhance its bargaining position, but this possibility faded as the battle lines hardened and the costs of such

attacks increased. In 1952, neither side was willing or able to exert sufficient military leverage to break the stalemate,
but during the last months of the talks, both China and the United States successfully used limited military force to
support their negotiations. US air attacks had by then devastated the North Korean infrastructure and provided
plausible evidence that the Americans were willing to escalate the level of violence. The Chinese, in turn, used ground
attacks to demonstrate the South Korean inability to fight alone and to pressure Rhee into accepting the Armistice. But
both sides also made concessions based on calculations weighing the value of their objectives against the potential
costs of continued fighting and the questionable prospects for the success of any major new offensive. The long,
tedious negotiations at Panmunjom and elsewhere eventually provided formulas for implementing these concessions,
thus resolving otherwise intractable issues.
The talks also illustrate the role of coalition partners and third parties in conflict termination. The efforts of the Indian
and other Commonwealth countries to find a mutually acceptable POW arrangement and the pressures exerted by the
UN allies helped shape the final compromise. The Soviet Union, while not an acknowledged participant in the talks,
played a key role in the Chinese and North Korean decision to negotiate, reinforced Chinese tenacity during the long
stalemate, and contributed to the final decision to accept voluntary repatriation. Syngman Rhee's resistance to the talks
and his efforts to reshape the Armistice at the very end of the negotiations also affected the policies of his superpower
ally.
As for the Armistice itself, the United States and its UN allies achieved most of their negotiation objectives and held
firm on voluntary prisoner repatriation. Some 50,000 Chinese and North Korean POWs refused repatriation, but any
assessment of the value of this moral and propaganda victory must be tempered by the knowledge that the additional
15 months of fighting cost more than 125,000 UNC and some 250,000 Chinese and North Korean casualties.[47] The
Chinese and North Koreans did most of the compromising over the course of the negotiations, but demonstrated the
ability to withstand the United States and to bring it to the negotiating table. Syngman Rhee gained major concessions
from the United States that would assure the survival of South Korea, but he remained unreconciled to the Armistice
for the remainder of his life.
Neither the war nor the Armistice resolved the underlying issues that led to hostilities in Korea. However, memories of
the devastation and the high cost of the conflict, combined with the strong military posture of both sides, have so far
deterred a new war. Meanwhile, the Armistice provided a mechanism to defuse military incidents, reducing the
possibility that such clashes might accidentally escalate. This is still true, even though many of the Armistice
provisions have been ignored or abrogated over the years. In 1994, the North Koreans announced that they were
withdrawing from the Military Armistice Commission, but they continue to maintain representation at Panmunjom.
Nearly half a century after it was signed, the long Armistice remains in effect.
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